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WHO OWNS TRADITION?
RELIGION AND THE MESSINESS OF HISTORY
Catherine Bell
Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Santa Clara University

I. Introducing the Problem
The question of "who owns a tradition" is not a new one, but it is being
debated today more clearly and more widely than ever before. It asks who gets
to define a tradition, who speaks for it, whose interpretation is authoritative
and, quite practically, whose books to read about it. Who defines "the Catholic
tradition," for example? Those who see it as a unique revelation transcending
time or those who would point to the histories of many church institutions
over the last two thousand years? Likewise, who is the authority on what constitutes "Buddhism"? Who should be the one to inventory what is most central to
Hinduism, or provide the "real" history of Islam?' And with all these questions,
are we asking whose definition is more correct, more legitimate or, perhaps,
simply more dominant? 2
Answers to the question "who speaks for a tradition" depend in great measure
on particular orientations to history. I want to explore this question by focusing on three groups who, in their own ways, claim to speak for tradition. First,
there are the scholarly types who more or less objectively chart a tradition as a
more or less coherent entity over time. Second, there are the religious leaders,
those with authoritative voices in religious institutions, who formulate what
the religion is, its key events in the past, and appropriate attitudes and experiences in the present. And finally, there are the practitioners, the communities
of people who are the current bearers of a tapestry of beliefs, ritual practices,
popular notions, and shifting attitudes-all appropriated in ways that accommodate and shape their cultural worlds. These are not mutually exclusive categories of course, yet arguably any one person is apt, I chink, to emphasize one
of these roles over the others. In my comments tonight, I will try to do justice
to all three orientations, but it should be no secret chat I am more the scholar
than the religious leader or practitioner.

If my question-who owns tradition-seems new to you, let me sketch out
for you a scenario in which the question becomes very concrete. It may strike
a chord of familiarity.
For almost two decades, I have caught a fairly wide variety of courses, but I
find myself in a very similar position in almost all of them. Whether it is a
class discussing the history of Christian scriptures or Japanese Shinto, I have to
decide whose history to present. Next quarter I am teaching my course on
Buddhism, and once again I have to decide on the textbooks and assignments,
all of which involve decisions on "whose history". Do I present the views of
Euro-American scholars who can have very definite opinions on what constitutes Buddhism, even arguing chat no such single, continuous tradition actually exists? Do I present the authoritative voices of the tradition itself, as in
revered scriptures or the teachings of someone like the Dalai Lama-although
which scriptures and leaders I choose will make a difference in what the class
understands as Buddhism. Or do I present the current tradition as practiced
by lay Buddhists today, what you will find "on the ground" so to speak and
what you need to know to make sense of a visit to a Buddhist temple in Sri
Lanka, Dharamsala, Kyoto, or our own Bay Area neighborhoods. The practices at such places often seem to have litde to do with what authoritative religious leadership or scholarship have to say.
All three groups-scholars, religious leaders, and practitioners-have different
takes on what constitutes the tradition. Of course, the most functional solution
for the classroom might be to present the question itself and something of all
three perspectives. But the deliberate coexistence of multiple views of a tradition is a situation chat leaves nothing the same. It is, in itself, full of tensions.
Here is a major tension. Whenever I present the history of Buddhist teachings
or institutions, chat is, the diversity of scriptures, teachings, and lineages, all of
which may be considered Buddhist in the past or present, it can seem like I
am crying to poke big holes in the cighdy woven fabric of my students' unconscious assumptions or idealistic expectations. 3 And many don't like it. Few
want to hear about centuries of purely oral transmission, sectarian fracture and
institutional fission, the late emergence of texts attributed to earlier figures, or
rituals to advance one's material welfare in the here and now. It is not what we
like to imagine for Buddhism, or for any religion. 4 When we come across it,
we can feel a bit disappointed. Discussion of these topics seems to deflate the
possibility of the truth, or validity, or even the clear identity of Buddhist ideas.
We can idealize religion, and then history seems to act as the great despoiler of
idealism-and perhaps even faith. Should that be? What is this idealism that
we have made so delicate and vulnerable? What is this history that we have
2

cast so blunt and rough?
As you can imagine, the problem is not specific to Buddhism. Most Catholics
do not really want to know the details of the history of the church as an institution. It is a rare group of Catholics chat would find the overall history of the
papacy anything bur disillusioning-and no one wants to be disillusioned. If a
scholar or priest or lay person should cry to present chis history, most
Catholics would wonder what he or she is up to. Doing history in chis context
tends to become part of the wrangling of liberals with conservatives, so pursuit
of knowledge of the institution's history ultimately seems politicizing. In the
Catholic church, as well as many other traditions, church leaders and scholars
often see themselves in opposing camps: for scholars, church leaders are in
denial; for church leaders, scholars are suspected of rude attempts at "gotcha." 5
Practitioners can feel poorly served by both groups.
II. The Scholars

"Daoism" until the establishment of an organized ritual community in
Sichuan about the third century CE. 8 For these scholars it is important chat
priests in the Daoist lineages found throughout the Chinese-speaking world
today invoke the latter definition, although most of our textbooks and all of
our popular notions hold on to Laozi as founder.
Writing about the history of Christianity, scholars often present views quite
different from those of church leaders and current practitioners. As an example
there is the latest in the "quest for the historical Jesus" project. In a series of
conferences held over the past decade, dubbed "The Jesus Seminar," a small
group of scholars concluded chat very few of the statements attributed to
Christ in the Gospels were likely to have been spoken by him. 9 Ocher scholarly
studies debate the social and economic make-up of early Christians communities, or the activities of similar sects of the time, attempting to re-construe the
very worldly reasons for Christianity's appearance and spread in its first few
centuries. 10

For example, the last twenty years has seen a very vigorous debate-among a
very small group of scholars-over how to date the emergence of Daoism in
China. Should we date this tradition from the appearance of its most famous
text, the Daodejing, long thought to be authored by someone named Laozi
about the fifth century BCE? Of course, new archeological discoveries are
revealing this text to be several centuries later than that, much more a synthesis of multiple works, and its author, Laozi, a fairly deliberate creation. 7 We
have long tended to date traditions like Daoism from the appearance of a
foundational text, perhaps because "the book" is so important in Western religions-and so important to what historians themselves do. But another group
of historians has argued chat there is no such thing as the religious tradition of

In recent years, however, the modernist assumptions behind how scholars do
history have generated what is called the "postmodern critique." This critique
argues that the narrative histories assembled by scholars for the last few centuries have not been nearly as objective as they thought. Rather, these histories
are shown to have always reflected the cultural and political context of the
scholars and served various self-interested concerns-sometimes rather blatantly. So many 19th century histories of Hinduism or African religions were
written in ways that justified colonization and even conversion. Some postmodern analyses show that a whole set of interlocking forces can shape our
conventional notions of a tradition. For example, when European
Enlightenment philosophers first wrote about Chinese Confucianism, they
had rather incomplete sources of information, but they also selected what they
wanted from chem. In particular, figures like Voltaire and Rousseau wanted to
trump the European churches and Christian piety of the day by showing that
it was possible to have a rational, ethical system with moral power but without
superstitious beliefs. 11 So postmodern analysts today are showing how early
European understandings of Confucianism were thoroughly wedded to the
church-state conflicts so important in Europe at the time. The major source
used by the Enlightenment philosophers were, of course, the writings of the
16th to 17th century Jesuit mission to China associated with Matteo Ricci.
With the hindsight of several centuries, and much more familiarity with
Chinese historical literature, we can now readily see how these Jesuit accounts
of Confucianism were also shaped by their conscious and unconscious agendas. In particular, some early missionaries argued that real Confucianism was
not to be found in the semi-degenerate practices of the day, but in the pure,

3

4

Let me describe what I think scholars are up to. In the 18th century, the writing of history began to recast itself as a formal discipline, self-consciously
embracing scientific principles. Like chemistry and physics, it was thought that
history could uncover laws and the fundamental causes of things. 6 History
could "explain" how events happened, just as the laws of Newtonian physics
could explain the movement of bodies. In this view, there are "facts," objectively knowable, which when organized in an unfolding narrative sequence can
describe the causal relationships behind events. Historians may argue over
which facts are the important ones, or which conclusions are justified by the
facts, but there has been a great deal of consensus on the goal of doing such
history. This is the "modern" view of history. It still generates useful and interesting arguments, and remains a basic assumption behind much of what we
think and read today.

ancient texts which, according to Jesuit translations, spoke of a single, absolute
God in Heaven-just like Christianity. 12

institutional and ideological continuity over rime. But religious leaders are
doing something rather different.

Postmodern accounts of the history of Western scholarship on Buddhism are
equally revealing of the biases we can carry and the extents to which we can
take them. Early Protestant translators were quickly convinced that the
Buddhism they encountered in Asia was a corruption of a pure, primitive
Buddhism-and they set our to reclaim this lost tradition themselves by
explicitly translating texts rather than consulting any living Buddhist teachers. 13 Indeed, these early scholars particularly noted that the Buddhism of
Tiber-with its rituals, images, incense, and hierarchy-perverted the purity
of primitive Buddhism just as the Catholic church perverted that of primitive
Christianity. Indeed, they tended to see Tibetan religion not as Buddhism at
all, bur as something they labeled "Lamaism." From the early 1600s into the
1900s, scholars continued to analyze various Buddhisms through stereotypical
contrasts between Reform Protestants and their view of the Roman Catholic
Church-that is, rational, non-ritualistic moralism versus devotional, rituallyelaborate authoritarianism. Needless to say, such biases made understanding
the historical facts, even finding them, much more difficult. 14

III. Religious Leaders

The implications of the postmodern critique are also the subject of debate, of
course. Some scholars have argued that the rejection of claims to objectivity
can be taken too far, appearing to foreclose even the possibility of objective
history. And if all history is subjective, culturally determined, and shaped by
self-interested agendas, then anyone's views-of Christian history or Buddhist
history-are just as valid as any other. In that case, what do you say to those
who deny the Holocaust, or offer historical rationales for white ownership of
the land in South Africa, or cast an early inaccessible Buddhism as Protestant
in spirit and later developments as degenerate Romanism? For this reason,
scholars today are seriously arguing what to mean by objectivity and facts, and
how to understand and counter their own inevitable biases.
While religious leaders rend to see scholars as trying to undermine religion,
most modernist and postmodernist scholars today do not see themselves as
using history to undermine or threaten a religious tradition. On the contrary,
they are very likely to see themselves as champions of the tradition-that is,
champions of the "real" tradition, as they define it. In this role, however, they
are compelled to challenge all other definitions of tradition-so postmodernisrs argue with modernists, and scholars argue with the definitions of religious leaders and lay practitioners. But when scholars blithely suggest that religious leaders are in denial over the facts of their institutional history, they too
can readily over-simplify. Scholars define "tradition" by looking for the facts of
5

Religious leaders have the task of formulating a religious persuasion based on
revelation, unique insight, or a sacred story. In doing so they need to organize
things in two ways. On the one hand, they present a body of doctrines and
beliefs as a timeless and coherent whole. On the other hand, they rake pains to
show char this holism is rightly tied to the key sacred events of the past.
Indeed, it is by defining a timeless holism tied to the central events of the past
that religious leaders formulate an "on-going" religious tradition. In this formulation, historical continuity is not a major emphasis-either for purposes of
accuracy or legitimacy. Rather, a living, relevant understanding of tradition is
built on the plausibility with which a set of ideas is presented both as a timeless body of "truths" relevant today and as nothing less than "the truth"
revealed in the past.
Scholars may fuss about whether Christianity is really any one consistent
thing, or whether it is accurate to think of Buddhism or Hinduism as coherent
holisms-and in doing this they will find good evidence of the variety and discontinuities of the historical record. But they are not pulling the sheet back to
reveal the small man operating the Wizard of Oz. To be a functioning religious
tradition , I am arguing, does not require historical continuity, and the lack of
it does not invalidate a tradition. For religious leaders, all it requires is the selfconscious link of the here-and-now to the all-important-then-and-there. This
is what makes a tradition vital, renewable, the past made in the present where
it can shape its world.

Ir is well-understood by theologians that a religious tradition is generated by
fresh formulations that create relevant links to the key events of the past. If
there were no innovative interpretations, the events of the first century CE
would be locked in rime and irrelevant to later ages. Every religion has interpretive strategies to ensure, in effect, a type of "on-going revelation": 15 through
Jewish law, Torah continues to provide the main guidelines for orthodox
Jewish life today; through theology, the mystery of Christ is still grasped as a
dynamic event for Christians today; through the continuous emergence of new
sectarian perspectives, the implications of the message of the Buddha are
probed to reveal a new recognition of the essential message.
Understanding tradition in this way does mean that we are never dealing with
a pure and complete message that was gradually compromised by time, trans6

mission, and all-coo-human representatives. Of course, religious leaders often
underplay the degree of innovation in which they are involved. They can
falsely imply chat nothing has changed over time, chat no interpretation has
been necessary. The most dynamic traditions, however, are chose that recognize
the way they put themselves together-often in the face of discontinuities that
can leave scholars perplexed.
Another corollary of chis view of religious tradition concerns diversity.
Diversity actually feeds the dynamics of a religious tradition, even though chis
may sound odd. Central ideas are formulated primarily through difference and
conflict. Difference and conflict are the natural result of ideas becoming
important to more communities. Ocher ways of interpreting and appropriating will heighten the demand on all sides for clearer positions, tighter holisms,
and more plausible links to the revelatory events of the past. While some formulations will become more persuasive, or more dominant, while ochers more
marginal or localized, the scuff of diversity is the raw material and the context
for the formulation of tradition by religious leaders.
IV The Practitioners
Practitioners are my third group offering a view of tradition. They are the
communities chat consider themselves to be Catholics, Presbyterians,
Unitarians, Quakers, Pureland Buddhists, or Sunni Muslims, etc. Their
definitions of tradition are not usually explicit or official, instead they emerge
in a culture of practices, customs, and attitudes.
For practitioners, tradition is incredibly regional, even local. Practitioners are
inevitably organized in groups chat quickly develop a form of cultural distinctiveness. Each exists just independently enough in their own minds to be able
to assume chat their way of doing things is perfectly right and natural.
Communities chat develop a great deal of interaction with other communities
will have formulaic ways of understanding their differences that protect identities. Irrationally prejudicial formulas are common. Sometimes interaction can
lead to a fair degree of influence and blending, but even in the presence of
concrete influence, such interaction can heighten the impetus for a distinctive
local identity. Tension and friction are the result. For most practitioners, the
"tradition" is not the international body in its social or theological forms-for
example, "the Church" or "the Mystical Body of Christ." Rather, tradition is
all the ideas, imagery, conventional practices, and local leadership that support
and sustain how the community goes about doing things.
Not only is the understanding of tradition invoked by practitioners particu7

lady ahistorical, it is also much less concerned with the overall coherence of
practices and ideas chat is so important to religious leaders. In most religions,
practitioners are likely to downplay doctrinal matters and emphasize imagery
chat is personally compelling with little regard for coherence. So my Irish
grandmother could be fixated on the Mother of Christ to the exclusion of any
other part of Catholicism, including sacraments, scripture, and certainly the
authority structure. Or, the ubiquitous focus of ritual life in the Buddhist villages
of Burma, northern Thailand, and Laos today can be the wonder-working
Upagupta, whose cult is never mentioned in the early scriptures and was
officially denigrated when it appeared in the 12th century. 16
The tradition of practitioners can even involve a type of quiet resistance to any
higher leadership chat sees the community as just one among ochers. Local
groups are more accepting of the leadership exercised by a national or international religious organization when the governing hand is rather lightly
extended. Yet even then, local identity and autonomy is reinforced in many
quiet ways. 17 Some of chis resistance can be seen in the various ways such communities can ignore important injunctions. I grew up in a Catholic community that generally ignored papal injunctions on birth control, with people saying things like: "I know the pope is a good man, but he just doesn't understand these things." There are profound theological implications in chat statement chat no one wanted to draw out. The same people who may be devoted
to the pope as a very personable figurehead, an icon of religious sensibility, or
powerful media image, are also apt to identify important religious experiences
outside the traditionally-approved mode, that is, experiences unmediated by
their religious leaders. Every time a community sees the Mother of Christ in
the window of another bank or apartment house, or the face of Christ in the
gnarled bark of a oak tree, and most recently oozing holy oil-all immediate
examples for those who live in Santa Clara county-you have practitioners
exercising independence over how the sacred is to be experienced-claiming,
in fact, chat it can be experienced rather directly and immediately outside the
ritual life of the church. le is an old tension, of course, and not peculiar to
American Catholicism: the more the ability to speak co and for God is vested
in formal offices, the more popular claims to direct access will arise, whether
they are meant as challenges or not.
For religious leaders, tradition basically means timelessness-a coherent, holistic truth that in its essentials is one with the truth laid out in foundational
events no matter how distant they may be. For practitioners, however, tradition is the taken-for-grantedness of current local practice. Links to the past are
assumed, but not explicated and explored. The emphasis on one's own world
of experience and what sustains it is most important. So, the definition of era8

dition found among practitioners readily conflicts with the definitions of
scholars and religious leaders. But most practitioners are not particularly concerned to notice or call attention to areas of overt conflict.

V. Conclusion
I have tried to demonstrate the simple idea chat there is no one way to define a
tradition. Tradition is not simply an enduring historical entity, or the presence
of Truth in time as defined by religious institutions, or just what a community
of believers takes it to be. Each one owns tradition-and so no one owns it.
But, you might ask, is one of these definitions ultimately better than the others, or are they all in fact equal? I think it is most accurate to recognize that
they exist for different purposes. Any one person, like myself, is apt to make
use of different definitions on different occasions. It is also useful, I believe, to
recognize that the way scholars, religious leaders, and practitioners each put
together their understandings of tradition means that they can easily talk past
each ocher or generate a fair amount of tension when they don't talk past each
other.
After recognizing the structural differences in how tradition can be defined, as
well as the legitimacy of these differences, it is still necessary to go one or two
more steps. Specifically, I want to draw attention to the way in which the historical record, even when contested, is becoming increasingly important for
religions in the modern world. In the emerging globalism in which we all have
to locate ourselves, our communities, and our beliefs, there is constant and
non-trivial interaction between the religious leaders and practitioners of different religions and cultures. In its most benevolent form, as a type of generalized
influence, the interaction of equally weighted traditions in proximity to each
other means chat they will inevitably influence each other's basic selfdefinition. Whether they have much or little in common, there is incentive to
emphasize what they share and perhaps begin to see such shared ideas as more
central to their identities than they may have been before. There are less
benevolent forms of interaction, of course, as when traditions have major areas
of overt conflict. Bue if they are talking, and not just battling each other in the
street, it is the historical record, assembled and debated by scholars from all
directions, that is being called upon to mediate their differences. The historical
record can seem a relatively neutral ground, less under the control of any particular tradition. So it is becoming more important simply to how religions
today coexist. In part, the historical record appears relatively neutral because it
is outside so many traditions, but also because, at its best, it thrives on affording debate and corrective revision of the facts.

9

Here is an illustration of the trend I am talking about. The Dalai Lama, a key
but not uncontested spokesperson for Tibetan Buddhism, is called upon to
represent Buddhism in a world in which multiple Buddhisms must coexist,
coming together and interacting much more often and fully than in other centuries. In this context, Buddhist leaders' sense of the essentials they share and
the significance of their differences takes on new forms. In a recent publication
for Western audiences, the Dalai Lama presents Buddhism as a single, coherent holism; but at the same time he argues chat the formulations ofTibecan
Buddhism are not simply late developments or degenerations; rather, they are
the ultimate realization of the original presentation of the Buddha. 18 Of
course, he is clear, those other Buddhisms associated with South and East Asia
have their own very real, but perhaps more partial, contributions to make. In
laying out the truths of the First Turning of the Wheel of the Buddha's
Teachings, the truths of the Second Turning, and the truths of the final Third
Turning, the Dalai Lama both defines a Buddhist tradition in terms of several
broad commonalities and gives pride of place to ideas that distinguish the
Tibetan tradition. A Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, or Sri Lankan Buddhist
leader could never have written this book or been the intended audience for it.
This book represents, I would argue, an early style of engagement in a global
conversation among Buddhist leaders. On the one hand, the Dalai Lama's
book invokes a language for talking about Buddhism chat goes beyond any
particular interpretive tradition. It casts the whole as a single, impressive
"world religion," marked by more unity than disunity. On the other hand, in
the process of establishing these unities, the Dalai Lama has to make sense of
the differences. As Buddhist leaders deal more directly and explicitly with their
particular differences-such as the institution of the Dalai Lama itself-it will
be interesting to watch how global and local Buddhisms come to be defined.
Certainly, in publications and presentations over the last 15 years, the Dalai
Lama has been very unassertive regarding some of the specific doctrinal ideas
behind the authority of his office. To avoid pushing on this front is increasingly natural and instinctive in a world where his office is very difficult for a
non-Tibetan Buddhist to recognize or understand. 19
There are other conversations going on, however, in which the role of the historical record is more pronounced, with powerful ramifications for local and
global Buddhism. These conversations are attempts to call Buddhism to
account for specific local responsibilities and to rise above the cultural pressures that might distort its adherence to the essentials thought to be shared
with others. So Buddhists from one corner of the world are addressing
Buddhists of another by calling attention to the involvement of Japanese
Buddhist leaders in the ideology of colonial expansionism in pre-war Japan 20 ;
or the role of highly nationalistic monks and monasteries abetting civil war in
10

Sri Lanka21; or the invisibility of poverty, misogyny, and social oppression to
Buddhist institutions in Thailand. 22 In all such cases, Buddhists are asking each
other in an increasingly global dialog: "Isn't Buddhism something other than
this? Can't we be more Buddhist?" In this way, of course, the definition of
Buddhism enters another stage.
A more familiar example is found in the recent Vatican statements on Catholic
and Christian relations with Jews. 23 This has been a contentious issue, some
would say since the beginning of the Christian tradition, 24 but particularly with
the enormity of the Holocaust-and the emergence of global forums in which
an accounting can be demanded and not easily ignored. In responding to the
distrust between these two traditions, this pope has not only taken the personal
route of praying as a Jew at the wall of the Second Temple in Jerusalem. He
has also explicitly engaged the historical record-at least in part. Acknowledging
big sections of the historical record is vital to a constructive dialog between these
two traditions. Offering apologies as evidence of internalizing the meaning of
this history, that is the stuff with which a tradition can reformulate or redefine
what it is. While the contributions of John Paul II's 1998 We Remember and
1999 Memory and Reconciliation have been judged partial by some Christians
and Jews, it is particularly interesting to note the historical accounting both
within these documents and in the evaluations of them. 25 There have been appeals
on both sides to the theological ideas that Christians and Jews hold in common,
and yet in the face of their differences and the specific issues of contention
between them, it is the historical record that offers the hope of reformulating
what each is as a tradition-in its own eyes and in the eyes of the other. In
effect, the use of history here enables the Catholic tradition to transform itself,
to break with the anti-Semitism of the past, to banish one type of historical continuity, and become more of what it now sees as central to its identity-witnessing
to Christ by virtue of love for all people, some (being) particularly close brothers
and sisters. This is a recasting, a revitalization, a redefinition of tradition.
John Paul II has not only demonstrated the need to use history today. In his
acknowledgment of Catholic historical failings, such as the more distant
Inquisition and the more recent failure to protest adamantly against the horrors of the Third Reich, he has also demonstrated the problems of dealing
with an historical record. It is hard to admit mistakes while maintaining certain notions of authority. This pope has seen a way to do this, in part, by
nuancing where exactly the fault lies. His statements acknowledge the culpability of sons and daughters of the Church, but do not attach culpability
directly to the Church itself. Yet he does state that the Church takes on the
weight of these faults for the sake of purification and renewal. This may not be
a statement of full admission of guilt, but it is one that takes responsibility.
11

I should emphasize that appealing to the historical record as a neutral medium
for dialog with another religious tradition or subtradition, and finding in that
a means for reconfiguring the tradition itself-well, nothing about this is easy
or instinctive for any religious community. Before the demands that accompany modern religious diversity, it was not particularly needed. So despite the
railing of scholars over the last two centuries, religions do not have a lot of
experience with this form of historicity. Now that it is becoming not just
unavoidable, but useful to invoke history as a neutral medium for certain
interactions, we should not conclude that history wins out over religion.
Rather, it means that religious definitions of tradition will find an historical
consciousness increasingly helpful, if sometimes sobering, for the challenges
of living in a multi-religion world. Some traditions will fight a few of the
implications of this historicizing and dialoging-as John Paul II has followed
his apology for Christian failings with a reiteration that Christian commitment
to the uniqueness of the truth of Christ and the universal mission rooted in
him must not be diluted by ecumenical goodwill. 26 But global diversity is the
new context for being religious; it is not going to go away; no one religion is
going to dominate it; and all will be changed by it, sooner or later. To be,
lovingly, our brother and sister's keeper in this world today, we have to learn
how, in what way to be a keeper of our brother and sister's religion. If our
religious traditions are vital, they will probably see in this the opportunity to
find a dimension of the original revelation that has never been so directly
glimpsed before.
In the end, is history the despoiler of idealism? Are my students, among others, correct to wish to avoid the history of what they want to think of as a
purer truth? If history is the despoiler of idealism, then our idealism is built in
a very narrow and ultimately inhuman way-inhuman because it denies the
relevance of so much human experience. If history is hard on truth, then our
notions of truth must be fragile constructions rather than robust insights.
Idealism is, of course, a very human trait; we can and do idealize many things.
But to live by an understanding of truth requires something beyond idealism.
Paul the Apostle spoke to this, as you know, in his familiar admonishment that
being called to a life in Christ means putting away the things of a child, and
ultimately embracing "difficulty" and "complexity" with courage and vision. 27
It has been said that a "scholar can hardly be better employed than in destroying a fear." 28 Well, I do not pretend to have destroyed any of the fears we have
of history. I have tried, however, to address them as directly as I can and to
argue for a view of both history and religion that does not pit them against
each other in the ways convention has so long demanded. History cannot simply be an "expert's" view of what should be identified and traced in time.
12

Religion is not simply people telling bad history. And truth is not a pure and
complete message dropped into the human morass where it is nibbled and
twisted and pulled to pieces. History is something to be achieved; an interpretation of the determinative events for any situation is always a goal and a challenge. History can bring a needed corrective to the isolation within which
many religious traditions have traditionally formulated their self-understandings. The growing embrace of history that we see today provides the medium
in which religious people will increasingly work out what it means to be an
American Catholic, an American Jew, a Japanese Buddhist, or a continental
atheist. You know it will feel "messy" while we are all in the thick of it, but in
exchange for an idealism of absolutes held tightly to our chests, we will be
reassured that the full range of human experience is being caught up,
addressed, taken into account, and appreciated.
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